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Debates about how to address the causes of climate change often focus 
on the need to transition to renewable technologies. In part this reflects 
the degree to which climate change is presented, in the first instance, as a 
scientific issue. It is, after all, the balance of scientific probability, as 
defined by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
which has established the need to reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) 
emissions. From 1988, when it was set up, the IPCC very successfully 
marshaled the authority of climate experts to establish an international 
consensus on the reality of human-generated climate change. That 
authority carries over into debates about how to address climate change, 
creating another near-consensus that technological change, and in 
particular renewable energy, offers the required solution. In this respect, 
both the problem, climate change, and the solution, renewable 
technology, are abstracted from the social contexts in which they arise.  
This article first explores the resulting political stagnation in debates 
about how to address climate change, drawing on local and international 
examples. Second it seeks to invigorate those debates by drawing on the 
social theory of environmental change. It focuses on three perspectives - 
eco-modernisation, eco-limits and eco-socialism, and discusses them in 
terms of what they prescribe for climate crisis. The article ends by 
outlining some themes for sustained engagement between ecology and 
socialism on the question climate crisis.  
Political Silences 
Not surprisingly, dominant policy debates on climate change resolutely 
avoid the question of social and ecological sufficiency, as against 
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technical efficiency. Economic growth is the unquestioned fact of 
political life, as is our cherished faith in the capacity of technology. 
Some examples may help establish this claim. One is the ‘Greenhouse 
Development Rights’ model, designed by the US NGO ‘Eco-Equity’ to 
address the distributional issues of climate policy. The model reconciles 
historic responsibility for emissions, uneven capacity to mitigate 
emissions and to adapt to impacts, with a global commitment to a 
minimum income of at least $6000 per capita (EcoEquity 2007). All this 
is achieved by a transfer of about one per cent of global output (estimated 
at US$56Trl in 2005) from rich countries to enable the reduction of GHG 
emissions in the rest of the world. At the 2009 Copenhagen UNFCCC 
some approximation of this model became the official policy of the G77, 
the ‘majority world’ group of 132 low-income countries (UNFCCC 
2008). Whilst a laudable attempt at reconciling the imperative to reduce 
GHG emissions with the requirements of global distributional justice, the 
model assumes technology can deliver: that a certain quotient of wealth 
transfer will deliver a measurable reduction in GHG emissions. The 2008 
edition of the report acknowledged as much, stating in a footnote that, for 
renewables, ‘cost estimates are all over the place’ (EcoEquity, 2008: 
109).  
A second example is closer to home. In March 2009 more than 500 
climate activists met in Canberra at the first Climate Summit to discuss 
ways forward for the Australian climate movement. The Summit 
displayed much the same tendencies for technological optimism, as 
expressed in its headline demand of 100% renewable energy by 2020. 
Prior to the Summit local climate action groups submitted a long list of 
policy proposals for consideration as official movement policy. The final 
list of policies covered climate targets, funding mechanisms for 
renewable energy, a ‘phase-down’ for fossil fuels, ‘revolutionising 
energy efficiency’, ‘repowering’ transport, ‘just transitions’ for carbon-
intensive communities, and measures to reduce emissions from land use. 
Nowhere in the list of eighty policy proposals approved by the Summit 
was there mention of economic growth or consumerism as a driver of 
emissions, and as something to be addressed. Throughout, the unspoken 
assumption was that technology can enable growth ‘as usual’. The only 
mention of finite resources was in a clause asserting the need for 
‘ecologically sustainable population levels’ in Australia. The clause was 
strongly opposed at the Summit but remained in the policy mix. This 
should not necessarily come as any surprise as population remains an 
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easy scapegoat. Ecological restrictions on population growth constrain 
peoples rights to reproduce and to migrate, letting polluters off the hook. 
In the context of Australia’s record-breaking per-capita emissions, 
demands to restrict migration or promote birth control, at home or 
overseas, misrecognise the problem but persist because they displace 
responsibility.  
The silence on sufficiency underpins NGO models: in early 2010, with 
the launch of ‘Transition Decade’, an initiative of a wide range of climate 
action groups in Australia argued for ‘structural transition’ that 
encompasses ‘concentrated investment and development in renewable 
energy systems, the elimination of harmful waste, the efficient use of 
resources and ecological conservation and restoration’ (Transition 
Decade 2010). Later in 2010, the ‘sustainable energy plan’ for ‘Zero 
Carbon Australia’ took the projected forty per cent rise in electricity 
demand 2008-2020 as a given, arguing this could be more-than 
accommodated by a fifty per cent increase efficiency measures that 
would come with a shift to 100% renewables (Zero Carbon Australia 
2010). Post-2010 growth was to be decoupled from energy, through 
‘ever-improving efficiency measures’ to maintain an indefinite cap on 
total electricity consumption (Zero Carbon Australia, 2010: 15).  
The related ‘green jobs’ debate brings home the full implications of 
embracing technology as the answer to climate change, and serves as a 
cautionary tale of falling into its ideological lockstep. In 2009 activists in 
NSW decided to hold a Climate Camp at the Helensburgh coal mine, 
which was slated for expansion. Debate about the choice of site raged 
over whether it was a mistake to target a mine that produces coking coal 
to feed steel plants, mostly for export. Initially, the organizers saw this as 
an opportunity to extend NSW coal campaigning into the Southern 
coalfields, and also to show how coal burning for industry was as much a 
part of the problem as burning coal for power. At local meetings in the 
run-up to the Camp, it was argued that these mining jobs should be seen 
as ‘green jobs’: where else would Australia get its wind turbines if not 
from a steel plant; and what delivers the power for making steel? Some 
key players quietly declined to support the Climate Camp, and Camp 
publicity shied-away from the coking coal issue, instead focusing on the 
symbolism of Helensburgh as Australia’s oldest operating coal mine 
(Climate Camp 2009).  
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In the event the Camp succeeded in extending the coal campaign, and in 
highlighting and questioning the massive expansion in mining proposed 
for the region, but in the process it also posed the question of what is a 
‘green job’? Not surprisingly, advocates of mining expansion in the 
Illawarra have stepped-up their rhetoric on the issue. In March 2009 the 
‘outline brief’ for Green Jobs Illawarra, ‘Power to the People Building 
Sustainable Jobs in the Illawarra’, made no mention of the global 
warming impacts of steel manufacturing or coal mining (Donaldson et al 
2009). In August 2009 the group hosted the architects of Australia’s 
NGO red-green alliance, the ACF’s Don Henry and the ACTU’s Sharan 
Burrows. The two had published ‘Green Gold Rush’, which advocated 
expanded industries, including ‘mineral wealth’, on the back of 
environmental technologies. At the Wollongong meeting Burrows turned 
this into an argument for mining, asserting that ‘Coal and steel… have a 
place in green industry’ (ACTU and ACF 2008; Cox 2009).  
By the end of 2009 the position had been further finessed into an 
argument not just for maintaining coal mining, but for mining expansion. 
The Green Jobs Illawarra Report to the State Government, released in 
November that year, argued that coking coal was the key element of 
‘green industry infrastructure’. A diagram in the Report titled ‘From 
Coking Mines to Renewable Energy Turbines: A Production Process in 
the Green Economy’, gave ‘South Coast Mines: Coking Coal Extraction’ 
a pivotal position, as the first stage in a flow chart leading to renewable 
energy. The Report concluded succinctly with this argument for the 
expansion of coal mining in the region:  
‘All of the renewable energy technologies that will power the 
future rely on steel. Steel manufacturing relies on coking 
(metallurgical) coal. Australia is the world’s largest producer of 
coking coal with 53 per cent of the export market… The 
Illawarra’s Southern coalfield is the only source of premium 
quality hard coking coal in NSW. The choice for policy makers is 
to exploit this advantage, service the domestic market and open 
up export opportunities, or, instead, rely on imports’ (Green Jobs 
Illawarra, 2009: 43).  
The NSW State Government welcomed the Report, demonstrating how 
quickly the demands for renewable energy can translate into demands for 
the expansion of industry, including coal mining.  
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These silences on growth matter. Failure to question the growth economy 
means we fail to question the primary drivers of climate change. It has to 
be recognized that in a capitalist growth economy technological 
efficiency will more likely fuel consumption and profit, not emissions 
reduction. The aim of this article is to help break these silences and 
highlight the limits of technology as a panacea for climate change. This 
is not a new problem. In 2004, for instance, the Clean Energy Futures 
Group noted: ‘It has been almost impossible to get onto the public 
agenda the possibility that renewable sources can’t save us and that 
solutions to global problems cannot be achieved unless we abandon some 
of the basic commitments of our society, notably to high living standards 
and limitless economic growth’ (Saddler, Diesendorf and Denniss, 2004: 
1). If nothing else, this suggests an urgent need to return to first 
principles, and to revisit the social roles of technology, in the nature-
society nexus. 
Nature-Society And Climate Change  
Debates about climate crisis reflect assumptions about the relationship 
between nature and society. As identified by David Harvey, approaches 
to nature-society relations fall into three broad categories: those that see 
society dominating nature; those that see natural limits as dominating 
society; and those that seek to free nature-society relations both from 
natural limits and from social domination (Harvey, 1996: 149). As 
outlined in Table 1, these constitute three distinct approaches to 
addressing the climate crisis. These three are not associated with 
particular movements or specific intellectual currents, nor are they 
mutually exclusive. Rather, they are analytical categories, constructed 
here simply to clarify the debate; and there is considerable overlap and 
debate between them.  
The first approach centres on ecological modernisation, and assumes the 
possibility of continuing to dominate nature and produce limitless 
growth, what Hornborg dubs ‘conucopia’ (Hornborg 2001). Here, as with 
welfarism, capitalist modernity develops the technologies to save itself 
from its own side-effects. Under climate change, as noted, this model 
posits a total decoupling of growth from emissions, through limitless 
efficiency gains. The second approach centres on ecological limits and as 
such, reverses the nature-society nexus, putting nature in control. The 
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limits serve to contain capitalism, by imposing models of de-growth, or 
maintaining a steady state, centred on closed-loop production. The third 
approach, ecological socialism, along with versions of socialist 
ecofeminism, offers the possibility, or dream, of freedom from 
domination, ‘whether of society or nature’, re-embedding economy in 
both society and ecology (Harvey 1996: 149). The focus of this approach 
is on de-commodification and the promotion of a regenerative model for 
social development, centred for instance on modes of commons 
governance.  
 
Table 1:  Addressing Climate Change: Three Models  














Ecological limits Modernity vs 
eco-limits, 
mainly north 































The three approaches produce different models of the relationship 
between technology and climate, and underpin much of the debate on 
climate policy. In what follows, each is addressed in turn, leading to 
conclusions aiming to identify social forces and possibilities for 
engagement beyond the current malaise. 
(a) Carbon intensity and eco-modernisation 
Ecological modernisers argue growth can be decoupled from ecological 
degradation and can serve ecology, saving itself from itself through 
technology and other forms of social innovation. Accordingly, for 
ecological modernisers, the world’s ‘ecological front-runners’ are the 
high-income high-growth industrialized countries (Mol 2000b). In these 
contexts, re-geared technology, re-grounded markets and eco-sensitive 
political institutions are assumed to create a cross-societal shift to 
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renewables, eco-pricing, and to ‘green’ states, movements and cultures 
(Blowers 1997). 
The ecological modernisation approach dominates the international 
climate debate, to the extent of monopolising governmental positions, 
and as we have seen, it has a powerful hold over the political imagination 
of the climate movement. Coined by Joseph Huber and Arthur Mol, eco-
modernisation usually assumes that growth patterns can be maintained 
provided they are regeared to ecological frameworks (Mol 2000b). In 
some versions, the goal is a form of ‘natural capitalism’, a new 
‘industrial revolution’, where ecological values are internalised into the 
inner workings of capital accumulation, such that one becomes 
indistinguishable from the other (Hawken, Lovins and Lovins, 1999). 
This model of ‘weak’ ecological modernisation is nicely evoked in 
Suzuki’s call for ‘making money like a bee: doing business without 
doing harm’ (Suzuki and Dressel 2002). 
Dominant models of neoliberal climate policy closely approximate to this 
position, with markets and profit harnessed to technological transition. 
The Stern Review on the economics of climate change is perhaps the 
clearest recent manifestation of the model at work (Stern 2007). Defining 
climate change as an externality of production, the review assumed that 
the most effective approach is simply to internalize it. By giving 
greenhouse gas emissions a monetary value, the market creates 
incentives for the development and take-up of renewable technology, 
decoupling growth from emissions. This notion that economic forces can 
be re-channeled to address climate change is nicely illustrated in the now 
dominant approach to the climate-trade nexus, where trade policy geared 
to stimulating economic growth is justified in terms of its capacity to 
stimulate trade in ‘environmental goods and services’ (Goodman and 
Wolfenden 2008). As the powerhouse of economic growth, trade 
becomes the guarantor of ecological modernisation, especially where it 
promotes growth in relatively efficient Northern contexts.  
Critics of these approaches often embrace a variety of ‘stronger’ 
approaches to ecological modernisation. The move from weakness to 
strength may be constructed along a continuum from less to more 
interventionist approaches. Emissions trading may be rejected, and a 
more interventionist market approach may be favoured, such as a carbon 
tax. Alternatively, the reliance on market incentives may be rejected in 
favour of more direct public investment and regulation. Relying on 
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subsidized private players to deliver may be seen as unreliable, hence 
more thorough-going forms of nationalization and expropriation may be 
favoured, approximating to a war economy. Finally, there may be 
proposals for a wholesale shift away from private property, to state or 
community-planned transitions to a post-capitalist ecological modernity. 
What all these approaches share is a faith in technology, and in the 
capacity of economic growth to deliver it.  
Additionally, the continuum may move from adaptive to more 
transformative technologies. Various geo-engineering proposals would 
be positioned at the weaker end of the eco-modernisation scale, as 
attempts to enable continued emissions; likewise for Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) as an end-of-pipe technology designed to enable 
extraction-as-usual; and for nuclear power, as another form of higher risk 
extractive technology. Other efforts at offsetting fossil fuel emissions 
through the expansion of carbon sinks may also be positioned in this 
way. Stronger forms of ecological modernisation may then entail 
renewable technologies that address the origin of emissions, rather than 
treating the symptoms. Hence, insofar as the 2009 Australian Climate 
Summit rejected CCS and nuclear technologies, and was critical of 
offsets, while embracing direct public intervention for renewables, it was 
positioned closer to this ‘stronger’ end of eco-modernisation. As noted, 
though, such approaches remain grounded in the assumption that 
technological change and other innovations can raise efficiency, and 
assume limitless prosperity and growth.  
Of particular interest at the ‘stronger’ end of the scale are the arguments 
for ‘reflexive modernisation’ as advocated by Ulrich Beck (see Dryzek, 
1997: 148). Beck contends high-income societies have passed into a 
‘second modernity’ forced to address the ‘side-effects’, especially the 
ecological side-effects, of ‘first modernity’. Beck is sharply critical of the 
‘metaphysical’ belief in the capacity of modernity to solve its own 
problems, in the ‘optimism of control’ very much in evidence with weak 
ecological modernisation, that, as reflected in geo-engineering, CCS and 
nuclear energy, simply displaces current risks into exponentially higher-
risk interventions. Yet the required ‘second modernity’ also subsumes 
and transforms ecologies: human society continues to dominate nature in 
risk society through reflexivity, just as much as it does under industrial 
society. Despite clear differences, reflexive modernisation retains 
ecological modernisation’s belief in modernity’s adaptive capacity.  
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Similar themes emerge from socialist forms of ecological modernisation, 
which argue that productive forces liberated from capitalist relations of 
production can be deployed for socio-ecological values rather than for 
private gain. This assumption that productive forces and associated 
technologies are neutral is not uncommon amongst ecological socialists 
(see Smith 1984: 31). A version, for instance, surfaces in Callinicos’ 
2003 Anti-Capitalist Manifesto, where he looks to large-scale public 
investment in renewables and transport to address climate change, within 
a globally-planned equitable mitigation strategy (Callinicos, 2003: 137). 
And in a recent ecological socialist account devoted to addressing 
climate change, Neale argues simply that capitalism possesses the 
technological capacity and the resources to mitigate greenhouse gas 
emissions, but lacks the motivation (Neale 2008).  
Across these approaches, as Mol has argued, the shared assumption is 
that what is needed to address climate crisis is an alternative modernity 
(Mol 2000a). Whether the alternative simply corrects a ‘structural design 
fault’, as Mol puts it, or engineers a wholesale reconstruction as 
promoted by Beck, or indeed supersedes the profit motive as favoured by 
Neale, the ultimate prescription for climate crisis is essentially the same. 
Ecological modernisation re-masters nature by re-managing it, whether 
through technocratic control, ecological reflexivity or socialist 
intervention. 
(b) Decarbonisation and ecological limits 
What may be termed the ecological limits approach offers a dramatically 
contrasting account, effectively a mirror-image of eco-modernisation. 
From this approach the growth society is seen as producing material 
products, entities with a specific ecological impact. Nature is understood 
to have its own eco-systemic laws, and within the bounds of these laws, 
for instance in relation to regenerative capacity, global nature is 
configured as a fixed stock of material. The production of goods requires 
a specific quotient of material and energy, directly sourced from the 
biosphere. Once nature’s regenerative capacity is factored-in, production 
proceeds at direct cost to ecologies: one wins while the other loses, and 
the society-nature relationship is irreducibly zero sum (see Hornborg 
2001).  
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Rather than asking how economic expansion can transform nature,  the 
approach asserts ecological limits, asking how society can live within 
them. Likewise, rather than devising alternative modernities to more 
efficiently reshape ecologies, ecological limits require us to ask how 
ecologies should shape societies. The assumption of limitless growth is 
rejected, as is the assumption of progress through productive expansion. 
In this respect the ecological limits perspective forms part of a much 
larger post-developmentalist critique of dominant political ideology.  
The concept of ecological limits was popularised in the late 1960s 
principally in terms of resource exhaustion, an issue directly addressed in 
1972 by the Club of Rome Report ‘Limits to Growth’, which proposed 
responding to ecological crisis with precaution and conservation. The 
concept was then later deployed through Schumacher’s notion of ‘natural 
capital’, a metaphor for earth’s stock of natural wealth that is consumed 
at humanity’s peril (Schumacher 1973). Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis of 
1972 refigured the limits model to accommodate regenerative capacity, 
viewing the planet as a living thing, which humanity can either render 
sick or healthy. As a living entity, Lovelock argued, the earth has certain 
needs: as long as humans place their needs above planetary needs the 
earth will suffer (Lovelock 1972).  More recently Lovelock identified 
climate change as the clearest manifestation of this nexus: our ‘way of 
life encroaches upon the domain of the living earth…. now it is 
changing, according to its own internal rules, to a state where we are no 
longer welcome’ (Lovelock, 2006: 7).  
The recognition of ecological limits obliges us, at the very least, to 
reduce growth: given that the production of whatever kind is understood 
to have ecological impacts, the imperative is to scale-down consumption. 
The approach is neatly encapsulated in the ecological footprint approach, 
where the ecological impact of consumption is translated into a spatial 
metaphor, to deliver the required regenerative capacity. In 1998 for 
instance, the World Wildlife Fund used its ‘Living Planet Index’ to 
suggest that the world first exceeded its regenerative capacity in 1975, 
and that by 1997 ‘consumption pressure’ was thirty per cent greater than 
the available space (WWF 1998). The challenge to live within limits is 
defined as the world’s key development challenge, and that challenge is 
located in the over-consuming countries of the rich North. 
There is, not surprisingly, a great deal of interaction between ecological 
modernization and ecological limits. Ecological modernizers argue 
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ecological limits can be superseded, and some advocates of ecological 
limits ultimately revert to ecological modernisation. Lovelock, for 
instance embraces nuclear fission as a potential circuit-breaker under 
climate change. Some combine technology and consumption with 
population. The Erhlichs, for instance, presented human impacts as a 
function of technology, population and affluence, reducing sustainability 
to a three-part formula. The model re-engaged Malthus, with population 
abstracted from society as an independent variable. In 1991, though, in 
the context of global warming, they rejected blind faith in technology, 
arguing for an end to population growth and a shift from affluence to 
quality of life, to reduce ‘the scale of the whole human enterprise’, thus 
refining the model into a two-part formula (Erhlich and Erhlich, 1991: 
12). In his magisterial account of societies facing ecological limits, 
Diamond  was more optimistic. He similarly argued that ecological 
impact is simply ‘a product of two factors: population, multiplied times 
impact per person’ (Diamond, 2005: 524). Collapse is precipitated by 
over-population and over-consumption of resources, caused by short-
termism and non-ecocentric value systems. Diamond, though, argued 
technocracy within limits could win out, provided contemporary societies 
created effective ecological forward-planning. 
Others reject both technocratic and population-centred approaches, and  
instead focus on  post-consumerism. In this version the growth economy 
is identified as the principal culprit, and superseding it the key challenge. 
For Herman Daly the goal has to be a steady-state society, that he argues 
is possible under capitalism (Daly 1977; 1996). Schumacher similarly 
posited a new localized capitalism, grounded in a wholesale social 
reorganization, a literal scaling-down (Schumaker 1973). More recently, 
but in a similar vein, Wolfgang Sachs frames ecological limits in terms 
of a rejection of efficiency in favour of sufficiency, using Herman Daly’s 
image of an over-loaded ship: ‘even if the cargo on a boat is distributed 
efficiently, the boat will inevitably sink under too much weight’ (Sachs 
1993:16). Logically, Sachs argues, sufficiency must set the boundaries 
for efficiency, otherwise we exceed ecological limits. Pointing out that 
the ecological benefits of increased efficiency are invariably cancelled-
out by increased growth, Sachs stresses the necessity for growth 
restraints, adding ‘what really matters is the overall physical scale of the 
economy with respect to nature’ (Sachs 1993:16). 
Contemporary climate change policy directly mirrors Sachs’ scenario. 
The focus on reducing the ‘carbon intensity’ of growth, through 
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efficiency measures, assumes carbon intensity can fall at a faster rate 
than growth. This is a high-risk venture. Using IPCC and World Bank 
figures from 2008, Li finds that ‘under no plausible circumstances could 
the objective of climate stabilization be compatible with the endless 
expansion of the global capitalist economy’ (Li, 2008: 3). The reasoning 
is simple. IPCC reports reveal that to keep the global temperature rise 
below two Degrees Centigrade, emissions must stabilize to 445ppm 
between 2010 and 2050. Under the IPCC’s most optimistic scenario of a 
yearly reduction in emissions intensity of 2 per cent, Li shows that the 
world economy would have to contract by 0.7 per cent per annum to 
bring total emissions down to the required level. Between 2010 and 2050 
this amounts to a total contraction of the world economy of at least 24 
percent (0.7 per cent per annum over forty years).  
Even if such realities were recognized, could they be agreed? As amply 
demonstrated by the recent Copenhagen events, we do not live in a 
planned world economy, but one where countries compete for leverage. 
More powerful, as Li notes, is the Jevons Paradox (named after the 
nineteenth century British economist), which insists that rising efficiency 
simply enables faster economic growth (also see Bellamy-Foster 2002). 
The Paradox has found wide currency with the publication of Jackson’s 
‘Prosperity without Growth’, based on a 2009 Report to the UK 
Sustainable Development Commission, which restates the central thesis 
of Herman Daly’s ‘steady state’ model, namely that living within limits 
requires a post-growth society, albeit through efficiencies under 
capitalism (Jackson 2010). The crucial question for the climate, then, is 
what type of society can generate wholesale emissions reductions on the 
basis of low or negative rates of growth? Li argues that only a post-
capitalist society offers such a possibility. Others, as noted, point to the 
possibilities of steady-state capitalist economy. Still others point to post-
developmentalist and post-patriarchal options, which draw on already-
existing conservation knowledges and practices, rather than pin hopes on 
future innovation. Here we move beyond an emphasis on limits, to 
approaches, discussed in the next section, that seek to transform social 
relations with nature in a post-capitalist, post-patriarchal context.  
In general, the limits approach subsumes society in nature. This 
addresses ecological crisis, but may simply romanticize autarchy, 
misrecognising necessity as conservation (Pieterse 1998). The assertion 
of limits may be driven by disenchantment with scientism in high-
income contexts, generating a conservationist ethic, of holding natural 
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landscapes ‘in trust’. More powerfully, though, it may also be linked to a 
Southern revolt against post-colonial developmental states, to nurture 
living environments against developmentalist projects. In both there may 
be a populist logic, amenable to reaction, but also open to possibilities 
for ‘radical democracy’ (Ziai 2007). 
(c) Social transformation and eco-socialism / socialist ecofeminism 
Accounts of the field of political ecology often confine themselves to 
discussing two dominant approaches – ecological modernisation or 
‘sustainability’ approaches, and ecological limits, or ‘radical’ green 
approaches (Dryzek 1997). As David Harvey notes, there is a third 
perspective, reflected in eco-socialist and socialist eco-feminist 
approaches that simultaneously seek to liberate society from social 
domination and from domination by ecology.  
For ecological socialists and socialist ecofeminists capitalism exploits 
both natural resources and labour power. As O’Connor argues, capitalism 
is founded on two contradictions, between capital and labour and 
between capital and nature (O’Connor 1998). This is reflected in the 
commodity form, which is ‘both a social (people-people) and a metabolic 
(people-nature) relation’ (Burkett and Bellamy-Foster, 2006: 152). 
Importantly, ecological impacts are not then conceptualized as an 
externality of surplus accumulation, but as its essence: hence capital 
cannot accumulate without creating ecological crisis (Bellamy-Foster, 
2002: 88). From this perspective, climate change is seen not simply a 
side-effect of capitalist development, but as part of the systemic 
exploitation of nature at the centre of capitalist development. Under 
capitalism, society and nature are in direct structural conflict: the 
resulting ‘metabolic rift’ can only be healed with the passing of capitalist 
accumulation.  
This ecological socialism recognizes the logic of capitalism’s ecological 
limits, as well as its social limits. Social limits are, of course, socially 
determined, with wage rates for instance, set by the socially-necessary 
minimum standard required to reproduce labour power. In contrast, 
ecological limits are defined by the demands of capitalism in 
confrontation with nature, and escalate with the intensifying efforts at 
technological innovation. Reflecting this difference, as O’Connor notes, 
while class conflict under the ‘first contradiction’ can be sidestepped or 
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displaced, the ecological crisis of the ‘second contradiction’ cannot be so 
easily avoided. The result is that now, with global climate change, 
ecological limits pose an incommensurable challenge to the very 
existence of capitalism. Eco-socialists therefore recognize that ecological 
relations have their own autonomy, and cannot be reduced to social 
relations through ‘simplistic rhetoric about the “humanisation of nature”’ 
(Harvey, 1996: 194). To put it another way, the forces of production 
under capitalism are not innocent of productivism – they cannot simply 
be re-tooled for a post-capitalist sustainable future.  
Clearly, though, ecological limits depend upon how ecological 
degradation occurs (Redclift 1994). With the latest period of globalised 
marketisation, ecological crisis is subsuming all other social conflicts, 
translating anti-capitalism into a 'struggle for survival' (Van der Pijl, 
1998: 47). Where once ecological exhaustion was displaced from one 
locality to the next, it now has nowhere to run, and is manifest as quite 
literally a global crisis (Bellamy-Foster 2002). The advent of this global 
contradiction between capital and nature, writ large in the form of 
climate crisis, creates profound possibilities. In ‘The Enemy of Nature’, 
for instance Kovel declares that with climate change ‘the moment for the 
global realization of ecosocialism has arrived’. Just as in the early 
Twentieth Century humanity was faced with a choice between socialism 
and barbarism, so today, he argues, we are confronted with the choice 
between ecosocialism and ecocatastrophe (Kovel, 2007: 258-62).  
But what, specifically, is proposed as the transformative alternative? 
Marx pointed to a communist society where the metabolic rift between 
society and nature, created by capitalism, is healed. In a passage that has 
often been quoted, Marx pointed to ‘the consummate oneness of nature 
and man – the true resurrection of nature – the naturalisation of man and 
the humanism of nature both brought to fulfillment’ (Salleh, 1997: 166). 
An eco-socialist system of production for need rather than for profit 
would thus by definition be ecocentric. The key is in the character of ‘use 
value’ under eco-socialism. How can use values be redefined in ways 
that do not dominate nature? As noted, some socialist modernisers have 
assumed that capitalist technologies, once freed from capitalist control, 
can be deployed to meet social needs. But if freely-associated labour is to 
produce ‘fruitful use value’ (or usefruct), these use values must be 
ecologically embedded. This requirement is not satisfied by capitalist 
technology. In other words, real non-capitalist social needs are by 
necessity defined with ecologies, not against them.  Thus eco-socialists 
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can only embrace technologies and the use values they produce if these 
‘foster ecosystemic integrity’ (Kovel, 2007: 268-272).  
In terms of practical transitions, eco-socialism points to ‘the commons’, 
particularly the local commons, as the foundation for ecocentric values 
and living environments (see Goldman 1998). Here, in non-commodified 
or de-commodified contexts, people create new ways of living within 
nature, freed from exchange value. Bennholdt-Thomsen and Mies, for 
instance, align their post-capitalist ecofeminism with a ‘subsistence 
perspective’, where peoples live autonomously of commodification, 
within living ecologies, outside of the ‘regime of wage labour’ 
(Bennholdt-Thomsen and Mies, 1999: 177). These invisible forms of 
metabolic labour prop-up the visible instrumental forms of productivist 
labour, performed in the main by men (see Bennholdt-Thomsen and 
Mies’ ‘Iceberg model of capitalist patriarchal economics’, 1999: 30; 
Mies 1986).  In these contexts ecologies may be defined as a commons to 
be nurtured, rather than as a resource to be exploited. The key to 
understanding the resulting transformation is in the contrast between 
regenerative or ‘metabolic’ labour and instrumental labour. Where 
instrumental labour exploits and exhausts ecologies until we breach 
ecosystemic limits, regenerative labour enhances ecologies: it ‘synergises 
the satisfaction of human needs with enhanced metabolic flows in nature’ 
(Salleh, 2009: 295). As such, in a post-capitalist and post-patriarchal 
society centred on regenerative labour, rather than on instrumental 
labour, there are no ecological limits. To put it another way, regenerative 
labour under eco-socialism defeats scarcity by redefining social need.  
Indeed, where eco-modernisers find their inspiration amongst high-
income ‘front-runners’, many ecofeminist advocates point to examples 
from the Global South. Here, it is argued low-consuming ecologically-
sufficient communities can sustain forms of labour that nurture and 
nourish nature rather than dominate it (Escobar 1995; 2007). Examples 
have been documented and found to offer eco-sufficient modes of living, 
especially as experienced by women (Rocheleau et al 1996; Salleh 2009). 
These ecological reproducers are grounded in reduced use, embracing 
small-scale subsistence technologies (such as small-scale farming, see for 
instance Shiva 1989; 2009). The search, here, is for a time when 
humanity acknowledges its embeddedness in nature, to a time when, 
‘Man’s domination over nature – the principle that has guided Northern 
society since the Renaissance – is replaced by the recognition that 
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humans are part of nature, that nature has its own subjectivity’ (Mies and 
Shiva, 1993: 319).  
The move is to a kind of healing: insofar as capitalism creates a rift 
between society and nature, between ‘human capital’ and ‘natural 
capital’ perhaps, eco-socialism and variants of ecofeminism aim to heal 
that rift, so that nature and society become mutually self-reproducing. In 
material terms, humanity lives within nature, whether or not the social 
system expresses that reality. Proximity to that reality is deeply uneven, 
stratified by developmentalism and neo-colonialism, and by gender. The 
resulting questions for mobilization are paramount (and are addressed 
elsewhere in this Special Issue, especially by Pearce and by Long, 
Roberts and Dehm).  
In general terms, rather than assuming a choice between technology and 
sufficiency, eco-socialists and many ecofeminists argue that  relations 
between them can be transformed. Such transformation can overcome 
both the drive to exploit labour and to exploit nature, in a double move to 
embrace non-commodified ‘metabolic’ relations. What this may mean in 
practice, though, is difficult to spell out. The first and most important 
point is that eco-socialists insist a low-growth economy under capitalism 
means injustice – ‘more austerity – and even more upward redistribution 
of wealth and power’ (Mueller and Passakis, 2009: 60); autarchy also 
relegates ecological priorities as ‘industry can and does more nakedly 
resist and erode environmental protection regulation (Grundmann 1991: 
219). As such, an eco-socialist response to climate change embraces 
planning and commons management: it must be a ‘collectively managed, 
just process of de-growth’ (Mueller and Passakis, 2009: 59). Herein lies 
the centrality of ‘really existing’ metabolic labour – performed for 
instance by unwaged household or subsistence workers – as it is from 
these contexts that some of the analogies and options for eco-socialist 
climate policy may emerge.  
Conclusion: Engaging Socialism and Ecology  
As argued here, the climate challenge is not simply a quantitative 
challenge for technocrats, of securing required emissions reductions 
through a quantum of investment in this or that technology. Climate 
change poses profound qualitative questions, for all of us to address, of 
charting possibilities for freedom from domination for both society and 
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nature. The three broad approaches discussed here – ecological 
modernisation, ecological limits and ecological socialism – are in 
constant dialogue, but answer this challenge in different ways. It is 
centrally important to appreciate the limits and possibilities they entail.  
The logic of continuing and intensifying climate crisis is already pushing 
us to reconsider settled positions. We have seen how various ‘weak’ 
approaches to ecological modernisation have unraveled. Emissions 
trading, international offsetting and carbon sequestration, for instance, 
that formed the foundation of Australia’s proposed Carbon Pollution 
Reduction Scheme, are already discredited. Debate has shifted to more 
direct mechanisms, such as a carbon tax and direct subsidy or regulation, 
moving the debate closer to modes of ‘strong’ ecological modernisation. 
Now, it is certainly time for the shibboleth of economic growth to be put 
on the table, and for a broader questioning of the technological optimism 
that characterizes so much of what passes for policy debate on climate 
change.  
Over time, as we press up against the limits of ‘strong’ ecological 
modernisation, we may expect debates between ecological limits and 
ecological socialism to move to centre-stage. In anticipation of this, 
formulations for an eco-socialist and ecofemimist future, and how we can 
get there, are likely to become centrally important. In recognition that 
anything like a program must come from mobilisation around the 
concerns we are living with day-to-day, rather than from an abstract 
blueprint, we could do worse to ask how ecology and socialism can 
deepen their engagement. A preliminary conceptual frame, drawing on 
Harvey, may offer us five themes - alienation, hierarchy, technology, 
difference and space-time relations – as key contact-points or ‘rubbing’ 
points between the two conceptual blocs, to generate deepened dialogue 
(see Harvey, 1996: 197). The five themes, applied to the climate debate, 
are highly suggestive of an open-ended means of operationalising 
ecologism with socialism. 
To address alienation there must clearly be a process of re-embedding 
society in ecology. Under capitalism ecologies are commodified and 
society is alienated from nature, as a resource to be exploited. Instead, 
with the assertion of eco-social commons, we may create the institutions 
to collectively regenerate ecologies, and reanimate our relationship 
within it, overcoming alienation. For climate this may mean creating 
non-market collective frameworks for reducing emissions, notably 
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through collective ownership and regulation (see Goodman and 
Rosewarne in this special issue). How can these institutions be 
constructed, and how would they operate in practice, to address the 
crisis?  
Second, we may ask how the required social relations of transformation 
will be generated? With the centrality of class power under capitalism, 
this forces us to think about class forces. Is there a leading class within 
capitalist production to offer strategic leverage, a class of immaterial 
workers, perhaps? Or, given the unevenness of the crisis, should we 
favour cross-class alliances, centred on localities, national states, or 
macro-regions, perhaps as reflected in the Bolivarian axis? Or should our 
focus be on ‘metabolic’ workers as a potential ‘meta-industrial class’ 
offering pathways beyond the climate crisis (Salleh 2004; 2010)? 
Then there is the question of how to redefine use value in the context of 
eco-systemic crisis. How can technology be redefined to enact metabolic 
relations with nature? Freely-associated labour within a socialist society 
by definition seeks to meet collective needs. Ecological socialism 
requires that under climate crisis the collective priority must be first and 
foremost to ensure the restoration of a stable climate. To realize this 
requires the mobilisation of collective intellectual and creative capacity 
and resources. How may we imagine the process of achieving this? And 
how can the process of getting there be articulated and pursued?  
Fourth, any agenda to address climate crisis must be capable of both 
mediating particular priorities and charting a universal strategy. Given 
the asymmetries of climate crisis there can be no possibility of imposing 
a ‘global climate commons’ that does not accommodate vast differences 
in responsibility, impacts and capacity. The crisis, as a product of 
capitalism, rewards those who exploit nature while others suffer the 
consequences. Yet at the same time, the global character of the crisis, as 
requiring a genuinely reciprocal response at a universal level, cannot be 
downplayed. The climate crisis, as eco-systemic crisis, has universal 
significance and the prospects for a global climate movement rest on the 
possibility of a universalizing consciousness. Clearly, the particularities 
of climate injustice are the foundation-stone of a universalizing 
movement, for a movement founded on ‘militant particularism’, to use 
Harvey’s term. But how to balance these dimensions?  
Fifth, and finally, there is the related temporal issue, of how to establish 
frameworks that reconcile the temporal scope of climate change with its 
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spatial logic. There is a need to address historical, present-day, and 
anticipated future dimensions of unevenness: biospheres are nested in 
temporal frames, and our capacity to act is shaped by our place in climate 
time. How, for instance, can we address the disjuncture between inter-
generational responsibilities? The knowledge we now have of the likely 
future impacts of our present-day activities creates new dimensions of 
culpability and responsibility. Justice for present and future generations 
may require urgent action now, regardless of historical legacies and 
responsibilities. How can these dimensions be reconciled?  
There is some evidence that such engagements between socialism and 
ecologism are underway. The politics of regenerative models, against 
dominant modes of consumerism, was for instance conveyed in a 
statement from the eight-country ‘Bolivarian Alternative for the 
Americas’ at the Copenhagen UNFCCC, where it identified ‘a structural 
problem of two forms of life — one way of living is the way of over-
consumption and waste, the way of luxury, of egoism and individualism: 
capitalism. The other way is vivir bien – living well – food enough for all 
and living in harmony with others and our Mother Earth, in solidarity and 
complementarily’ (ALBA 2009).  
Questions of unevenness and the required climate justice were also 
foregrounded in ‘Peoples’ World Conference on Climate Change and 
Mother Earth’s Rights’, hosted by Bolivia’s President in 2010. The 
conference offered a convergence point for ecologism and socialism in 
the backwash from Copenhagen, and as a prefigurative moment, 
anticipated some of the strategic questions of mobilization. Indeed, one 
may go so far as to liken the event, and its potential symbolic power, to 
the Zapatistas’ ‘First Intercontinental Encounter Against Neoliberalism’, 
held in Chiapas in 1996, that initiated Peoples Global Action and began 
the ten-year-long cycle of mobilizations for justice globalism.  
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